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ABSTRACT
Federal courts have sometimes applied the doctrine of licensee estoppel to
prohibit a trademark licensee from challenging its licensor’s rights to the
licensed mark, particularly where the licensor has failed to establish and monitor
quality control and the licensee contends that abandonment has occurred. This
Article examines the history of licensee estoppel and those cases on which courts
have and have not enforced licensee estoppel; often on the grounds that
enforcing licensee estoppel would not serve the public policy of protecting
consumers from deceitful practices. This Article also compares trademark
licensee estoppel to patent licensee estoppel and recognize that courts have been
far less willing to apply licensee estoppel in patent licensing cases although
similar principles are involved. This Article concludes that the doctrine of
trademark licensee estoppel should generally be abolished.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines whether a licensee of a trademark1 should be
estopped from challenging its licensor’s ownership of the mark, or the
enforceability or validity of the mark, when that licensor has licensed its mark
but has failed to impose quality control standards or, having imposed such
standards, has failed to monitor the quality of goods or services sold by the
licensee under the mark.2
Through a comparison of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Lear v. Adkins, holding that a licensee of a patent should not be estopped on
public policy grounds from challenging the validity of its licensor’s patent,3
to cases barring trademark licensees from challenging their licensors on the
grounds of licensee estoppel, this Article posits that the consuming public
benefits from the proper use of trademarks and that a strong public policy
exists to permit a trademark licensee to challenge the validity or ownership of
its licensor’s mark under certain conditions – particularly where the licensor
has engaged in naked licensing.4 This is because uncontrolled, or “naked,”
licensing may result in the trademark ceasing to function as a symbol of
quality and source because the licensor has abandoned the mark and its
exclusive rights to use the mark.5 Consider, for example, the family driving
1. The terms “trademark,” “service mark” and “mark” are used throughout
this article to designate a trademark used on goods or a service mark used in
association with services. A trademark serves to identify to a consumer the
relative quality of a product in addition to the source of that product. See K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 314 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that “a trademark might also serve the function of
identifying product quality for consumers”).
2. “The licensee estoppel rule is founded on the view that a licensee should
not be permitted to enjoy the use of the licensed mark while at the same time
challenging the mark as being invalid.” THOMAS MCCARTHY, 3 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:63 (5th ed. 2020).
3. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670–71, 676 (1969).
4. It is well established that “[a] trademark owner may grant a license and
remain protected provided quality control of the goods and services sold under
the trademark by the licensee is maintained.” Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960
F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992). However, uncontrolled licensing of the mark that
fails to prevent the licensee from selling goods of any type or quality associated
with the licensor’s mark can cause the mark to lose its significance and may result
in the consumers’ deception. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959). Naked licensing also may result in the deception of
consumers regarding the licensor’s connection with the goods sold under the
licensed mark. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3:11 (a trademark indicates that
the trademark owner is the source of quality standards of goods or services sold
under the mark).
5. Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596
(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 18:48 (4th ed. 2001)).
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cross country, stopping at McDonald’s restaurants for meals. When burgers
are sold under the McDonald’s trademark, the family has the right to expect
that the taste, quality and size of the product will not vary, whether bought in
Maryland, Missouri or California.
Trademarks can be extremely valuable. A valuation expert engaged by
Forbes Magazine in 2011 opined on the values of well-known marks owned
by some American companies.6 At the time, the APPLE mark was valued at
$29.5 billion; in 2019, its value reached $205.5 billion.7 In 2011, the
GOOGLE mark was valued at $44.3 billion; by 2019, its value was $167.7
billion.8
While patents and copyrights have life spans established by federal
statutes,9 trademarks generally do not and can therefore exist as a proper
designator of the source of goods and services for decades or even centuries,
as long as rights in the mark are not lost by some omission or commission on
the part of the mark’s owner, such as allowing the mark to be abandoned or
the mark becoming the generic name for the goods or services sold under it.10
The world’s oldest recognized trademark is BASS, a beer mark that was
registered with Great Britain’s Intellectual Property Office in 1876 and
remains valid to this day.11 Another beer mark, STELLA ARTOIS, has roots
to 1366 and the Den Hoorn brewery, in Leuven, Belgium, which adopted the
mark ARTOIS in honor of its early 18th century brew master. The STELLA
ARTOIS mark, first used in 1926 as a seasonal Christmas beer, was registered

6. Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15,
2011, 11:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the10-most-valuable-trademarks/ [https://perma.cc/S9CA-CYYU].
7. Id.; Kurt Badenhausen, The World’s Most Valuable Brands 2019; Apple
May
22,
2019,
on
Top
at
206
Billion,
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2019/05/22/the-worlds-mostvaluable-brands-2019-apple-on-top-at-206-billion/
[https://perma.cc/7LSC4PDY].
8. Stonefield, supra note 6; Badenhausen, supra note 7.
9. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act increased the term of
copyrights for works of single and joint authorship to life of the last surviving
author plus 70 years; for anonymous and pseudonyms works and works made for
hire for 95 years from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of
creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2018). Utility and plant patents have a life term of 20
years, measured from the date of the filing of the patent application. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 154, 161 (2018) (establishing term of patents); See also 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 2, at § 6:10. Design patents have a life term of 15 years, measured from the
date of the grant of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2018).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505,
509–10 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
11. BASS, Registration No. UK 00000000001. Its next renewal date is
January 1, 2022. Id.
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with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) in 1981.12
These trademarks are intended to convey to a consumer that no matter where
in the world one of these beers is purchased and consumed it will be of
consistent taste and quality with any other beer so branded and dispensed
anywhere else in the world. Imagine the diversity of quality and taste if every
licensee of STELLA ARTOIS was permitted to employ its own recipe in the
brewing of this beer.
The Lanham Act (the “Act”)13 defines a “trademark” as:
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof–
used by a person, or
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to
register on the principal register established by this Act,
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown.14

A trademark can be a “word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination” of the forgoing.15 A trademark may be based on a shape, a
product configuration,16 or even a color.17 At least one court has held that a
trademark is not a property right; rather, it is an identifier of source which
ostensibly provides more benefit to the consuming public than to the mark’s
owner.18 While a trademark’s purpose is to indicate the source of the goods,
its protection is based upon a mark’s informative value to consumers.19
Although a trademark’s life can span centuries, a trademark does not
possess eternal life. Abandonment is to a trademark what kryptonite is to
Superman – which is to say that abandonment results in an owner’s loss of all

12. Thomas C. Frohlich & Alexander Kent, These are the 10 Oldest Logos
in the World, TIME, June 20, 2014, http://time.com/2904290/10-oldest-companylogos/
[https://perma.cc/3EA4-VS29];
STELLA
ARTOIS,
Heritage,
http:www.stellaartois.com/en_gb/heritage.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
13. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1051–1141(n) (2018).
14. Id. at § 1127.
15. Id.
16. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765 n.1 (1992).
Trade dress is a product’s total image and overall appearance. Trade dress may
include size, shape, color, color combinations, texture, graphics, or sales
techniques. Id.
17. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 (1995).
18. Door Sys. Inc., v. Pro-Line Door Sys., 83 F.3d 169, 173 (7thh Cir. 1996).
19. Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 73
TRADEMARK REP. 222, 222–24 (1983).
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rights associated with the mark. A mark shall be deemed abandoned if either
of the following occurs:
When its use has been discontinued with the intent not to resume such
use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse
for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.
“Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark.
When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission
as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name
for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or
otherwise to lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall
not be a test for determining abandonment under this paragraph.20

A mark’s owner, then, can lose its right to exclusive use of the mark if it
abandons use of the mark without intent to resume use in a reasonable time
frame.21 The mark’s owner can also lose its exclusive rights in the mark
through its own omissions or commissions, where the result of the failure to
act or the actions taken is that the mark loses its ability to designate a single
source of the goods or services that consumers associate with the mark.22 One
of the contexts in which abandonment by omission is often claimed, and
which is the subject of this Article, is when the owner of a mark has licensed
its mark to a third party and has failed to exert quality control over the
licensee’s use of the mark.23
The stakes are high when a party claims a mark has been abandoned.
Once abandoned, the mark’s owner has lost the exclusive use of the mark, the
mark is available for anyone’s use, and priority of use will determine who has
superior rights.24 A mark can lose its significance as a source identifier due
to the manner in which the mark’s owner (the licensor) licensed a third party
(the licensee) to use the mark.25 In part, this comes about because the
consumer of the trademarked goods has the right to expect that all goods
branded with the mark will be of equal quality, whether made of steel or
ground beef, and regardless of who actually produced or sold those goods. If
a hamburger is branded MCDONALD’S, it should taste the same and be made

20. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
21. Nonuse for three consecutive years creates a rebuttable presumption of
abandonment. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also Edward K. Esping, Granting of “Naked” or Unsupervised
License to Third Party as Abandonment of Trademark, 118 A.L.R. FED. 211
(Originally published in 1994).
24. George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Ent. Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 400 (4th Cir.
2009); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 17.1.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2); see also Esping, supra note 23.
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from the same recipe whether purchased at a MCDONALD’S restaurant in
Washington State or Washington, D.C.
Two examples of a licensor’s conduct that can result in the loss of a mark
are assignments in gross and naked licensing.26 Assignments in gross occur
when the mark’s owner assigns use of the mark to a licensee unassociated
with the licensor’s product.27 Naked licensing by the mark’s owner, on the
other hand, occurs when the licensor “does not exercise adequate control over
its licensee’s use of a licensed trademark such that the trademark may no
longer represent the quality of a product or service the consumer has come to
expect.”28 A license that fails to restrict or control the quality of goods or
services imparts a finding of naked licensing.29 Naked licensing can arise
even where the license agreement requires adherence to the licensor’s
standards of quality, but the licensor fails to enforce the terms it has imposed
on a licensee for trademark use.30 A licensor can, of course, engage in naked
licensing by failing to impose terms for the licensee’s use of the mark.31
Licensors sue their licensees for trademark infringement,32 and some
licensees attempt to raise the affirmative defense of abandonment, often
because of the licensor’s actions or the licensor’s failure to act to protect the
integrity of its mark, including the licensor’s naked licensing.33 The basis for
the claim of abandonment by naked licensing is that when the mark is used on
goods of varying quality or uneven kind, consumers can be deceived and
misled and the mark will cease to serve as an informational device or a source
of origin.34
In most situations where the licensor is challenged by its licensee on the
basis of alleged naked licensing, the licensor counters that a written licensing
agreement between the licensor and the licensee bars the licensee from
asserting such a claim, or, absent such a prohibition, that the equitable doctrine
of licensee estoppel bars the licensee from challenging the licensor’s
ownership of the disputed mark.35

26. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 17:6.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
28. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 512 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d
589, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2002)).
29. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515–19 (9th
Cir. 2010).
30. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367–69 (2d
Cir. 1959).
31. Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust, 289 F.3d at 596–98.
32. See Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540 (10th Cir. 2000).
33. John C. Flood of Va., Inc. v. John C. Flood, Inc., 642 F.3d 1105, 1108
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
34. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977).
35. John C. Flood of Va., Inc., 642 F.3d at 1010.
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This Article examines the equitable doctrine of licensee estoppel and
argues that a trademark licensee should be permitted to challenge ownership
of its licensor’s mark on the basis that the licensor has engaged in conduct that
has eroded the licensor’s rights in the mark and that has, or will, deceive the
consuming public. Section II examines trademarks in general; Section III
discusses the licensing of trademarks by owners to third parties. It compares
these licenses to a body of law that concerns patent licensing and introduces
the equitable doctrine of licensee estoppel, a circumstance in which some
courts do not permit a trademark licensee to challenge the licensor’s rights in
the licensed mark. Section IV discusses the requirements that a licensor of a
trademark monitor and control the quality of the goods and services sold under
the licensed mark, and the effects of its failure to do so. In that license of a
mark without quality control results in a licensor’s loss of rights in a mark, as
a form of abandonment, Section V offers that the equitable doctrine of
licensee estoppel that is applied to prevent a licensee from challenging its
licensor’s ownership of the licensed mark is against public policy and should,
itself, be abandoned. Finally, Section VI concludes that licensee estoppel,
even if not generally abandoned as against public policy, should not bar a
licensee from challenging its licensor’s rights in the licensed mark.

II. TRADEMARKS, GENERALLY SPEAKING
An overview of trademarks is provided. This Article will examine what
a trademark is, how and when trademarks are used, and why trademarks are
used. A brief discussion on infringement will be followed by a brief
explanation of infringement remedies.
A trademark serves to identify the source of a seller’s goods or services
and set them apart from others who make or sell similar goods or services.36
A service mark is similar to a trademark but distinguishes services provided
by one source from those services provided by another source.37 Ground beef
is branded with a trademark while an insurance policy is branded with a
service mark.38
Some marks do a better job than others when it comes to serving as a
designator of the source of goods or services. For example, strong marks
adequately serve to identify the source of a product or service, and weak marks
fail this task.39 Fanciful marks, such as EXXON or KODAK, are made up;
arbitrary marks, such as APPLE or COACH, are common words not
associated with the product. Fanciful and arbitrary marks are both considered
strong marks.40 Suggestive marks – marks that suggest a characteristic of a
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
37. Id.
38. Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff Wilkerson, Understanding Trademark
Strength, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 535 (2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
39. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1976).
40. Id. at 11.
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product or service,41 such as ESKIMO PIE or CYCLONE FENCES – are also
strong and inherently distinctive, meaning a source of goods is
instantaneously designated by use of a strong mark.42 The level of inherent
distinctiveness of a mark is called conceptual strength. Courts also look at the
commercial strength of a mark. Commercial strength has been defined as the
“legal muscle” of a mark that comes about through exposure of the mark to
consumers; that is, the actual measure by which a mark successfully acts as a
source of origin in the minds of consumers.43 “Legal muscle” is often
demonstrated through large advertising expenditures, duration of use, or
unsolicited media exposure.44
Rights to a trademark are not dependent on registration, but rather arise
from use in commerce. Registration on the USPTO’s Principal Register is,
however, prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark,
ownership, and entitlement of use.45 Registration is not a right and under
certain circumstances registration may be withheld.46 Further, even if the
mark is registered, its validity, enforceability, and ownership are rebuttable.47
Most marks are protected under common law, not by registration, but in either
case rights in the mark come from only one thing – use in commerce.
Once a mark is registered on the USPTO’s Principal Register, the mark
can still be challenged on the basis of fraud, abandonment, or that the mark
has become generic (i.e., the public has come to call the product by its
trademark).48 ESCALATOR, NYLON, and ASPIRIN were at one time valid
trademarks but lost their meaning as a designator of source when the public
began to refer to the object bearing the mark by its brand. The product was

41. Sands, Taylor & Woods Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 952–53
(7th Cir. 1992).
42. Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9; ESKIMO PIES, an ice cream bar
introduced in 1921, announced in June 2020 it will abandon its name and re-brank
to become EDY’s PIE. Kelly Tyko, Eskimo Pie to become Edy’s Pie: Rebranded
ice cream bars expected to arrive in early 2021, (Oct. 6, 2010),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/10/06/edys-pie-ice-cream-barseskimo-pie-rebranding-dreyers/5897024002/ [https://perma.cc/QU9Y-MWVP].
43. Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., 679 F.3d 410, 419 (6th
Cir. 2012).
44. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 187, 191 (2004).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2018).
46. In Re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), abrogated by In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
47. Bell v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1249 (S.D. Cal.
2008).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b); United States Jaycees v. Chicago Jr. Ass’n of
Commerce & Indus., 505 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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no longer an ESCALATOR brand moving staircase. In the eyes of consumers,
it had become merely an escalator.49
If a challenge to a mark’s registration is successful, perhaps on the basis
that the mark has been abandoned by its owner, the registration may be
cancelled and the owner’s rights may not be enforced by a court, regardless
of its USPTO registration. Many abandonment cases arise because the mark’s
owner failed to use the mark over a period of years without an intention to
resume use.50 Abandonment cases are also brought on the basis that the
mark’s owner engaged in naked licensing – licensing without quality control
– or by attempting a gross assignment of the mark.51

A. Infringement of a Trademark
Every state provides the right to bring an action for trademark
infringement, whether by common law, statute, or both. The Act also provides
for trademark infringement action.52 Unlike the Copyright Act,53 the Act does
not contain its own statute of limitations. In many cases, the statute of
limitations governing actions for fraud in the state in which the infringement
action is brought will govern.54
The Act establishes a cause of action for the unauthorized use in
commerce of any registered or unregistered mark in connection with the sale
or promotion of goods or services if that use is likely to cause confusion, to
cause mistake, or to deceive the consuming public as to affiliation,
connection, association, origin, sponsorship, or approval.55 A likelihood of
confusion exists “if the defendant’s actual practice is likely to produce
confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin of the goods or services
in question.”56 Each of the federal circuits has adopted a non-exclusive, multifactor test to determine whether, due to the unauthorized use of a mark, there
exists a likelihood of confusion.57 While the federal circuits are not uniform
49. See, e.g., King-Seely Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1963) (holding that THERMOS had become generic).
50. Id.
51. Sands, Taylor & Woods Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 956 (7th
Cir. 1992).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125 (2018).
53. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (2018).
54. PepsiCo Inc. v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 578 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Exide Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (N.D. Ill.
2001).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114; 1125.
56. Potomac Conf. Corp. v. Takoma Acad. Alumni Ass’n, No. CIV.A. DKC
13-1128, 2014 WL 857947 at *16 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2014) (quoting CareFirst of
Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2006)).
57. See, e.g., Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657
F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1981); Polaroid v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.
1961); Interspace v. Lapp, 721 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1983); George & Co., LLC v.
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in their adoption of factors, the factors adopted by each circuit do overlap.
Nonetheless, there is no mechanical test for determining likelihood of
confusion. Each case must be decided on its own facts.58 But generally,
courts apply some combination of the following factors: (1) strength of the
marks;59 (2) similarity of the marks; (3) proximity of the products; whether
the senior user will “bridge the gap,” for example, a seller of pancake batter
may expand into also selling syrup; (4) evidence of actual consumer
confusion; (5) the defendant’s good faith in adopting use of the mark; (6) the
Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009); Xtreme Lashes v.
Extended Beauty, 576 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2009); Frisch’s Restaurants v. Elby’s
Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982); Autozone, Inc. v. Stricks, 543 F.3d
923 (7th Cir. 2008); Squirto v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980);
Network Automaton v. Advanced System Concepts, 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.
2011); Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002);
Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2010).The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, on appeal from a district court, will apply the law of the regional
circuit. Keystone Retaining Wall Systems, Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444
(Fed. Cir. 1993). Whether likelihood of confusion is a question of fact or law will
affect the manner in which the decision of a lower court is reviewed by an
appellate court. If likelihood of confusion is a question of law, unless an appellate
court has a firm and definite conviction that the lower court committed a mistake,
that the determination of underlying facts is clearly erroneous, the appellate court
must accept the findings of the trial court. Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc.
456 U.S. 844 (1982). Most circuits hold that likelihood of confusion is a question
of fact. See, e.g., Boston Beer Co., Ltd. P’ship v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d
175 (1st Cir. 1993); Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2007); Durox Co.
v. Duron Paint Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 882, 885 (4th Cir. 1963); Soc’y of Fin.
Examiners v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 41 F.3d 223 (5th
Cir. 1995); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423 (7th Cir. 1985);
Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771 (8th
Cir. 2010); Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F. 3d 1252 (9th Cir.
2001); Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002);
Welding Servs. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007). The Second and Six
Circuits treat likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of law and fact. Harold
F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960); GMC
v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2006). The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit treats this issue as a question of law. Bridgestone Ams. Tire
Operations, LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
58. Application of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
59. Strength of a trademark is reviewed for conceptual and commercial
strength. Conceptual strength is determined with reference to the categories of
marks enumerated in Abercrombie & Fitch Co., e.g. fanciful, arbitrary,
suggestive, descriptive, and generic. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). Commercial strength is shown by the level of the
user’s exclusive use and the “extent to which it, in the eyes of consumers, conveys
the affiliation, connection or association of such person with another person,” or
the source of the product purchased. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note 38, at 535.
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quality of the defendant’s products; and (7) sophistication of consumers of the
goods and services.60 Each of these factors is not always relevant or of equal
weight.61

B. Remedies for Infringement
A defendant who has engaged in trademark infringement can be held
liable in a civil action brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 for a mark registered
with the USPTO, or § 1125 for an unregistered mark established under the
common law.62 Although considered an extraordinary remedy, a plaintiff may
be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, restricting a defendant from use of
the mark in a manner likely to cause confusion.63 To obtain injunctive relief,
a moving party must establish: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
likelihood the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction does not
issue; (3) that the balance of the equities tip in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4)
that an injunction is in the public interest.64
In addition to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, a trademark
infringer can be held liable for monetary damages in the form of disgorgement
of its profits and restoration of any harm suffered by the plaintiff.65 Courts
also have statutory discretion to increase the award of damages by up to three
times.66 Monetary damages can also be awarded under state statutes and the
common law.67
The Act provides courts wide discretion in awarding damages: “If the
court shall find the amount of recovery based on profits is either inadequate
or excessive, the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as
the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case.”68
In addition to a monetary award of profits and damages, a court is also
authorized to award attorney’s fees and pre-judgment interest upon a finding
that the defendant’s actions were “exceptional.”69
60. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961);
see also, George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Ent. Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 400 (4th
Cir. 2009) (for a more recent and expanded list of factors).
61. George & Co. LLC, 575 F.3d at 393.
62. Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. SPI Spirits Ltd., 726 F.3d 62,
72 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
768 (1992).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2018).
64. Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 22 (2008).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2018).
66. Id.
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 (AM. L. INST.
1995).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
69. Id. § 1117(a), (b); “Exceptional” is defined by the Supreme Court as
“rare” and “not ordinary.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
572 U.S. 545, 553–54 (2014) (a patent case) (citing Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No.
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A plaintiff can look beyond the infringing entity and seek to hold the
officers and directors liable for the acts of the infringer on a theory of
secondary liability.70 Secondary liability claims include vicarious71 and
contributory72 trademark infringement. Often, a director or an officer of a
small entity has the power to control the infringement and benefits from it or
a third party, not a direct infringer, has knowingly supplied the means to
infringe, giving rise to secondary liability for the actions of the direct
infringer.73 The stakes of an infringement action could not be higher for all
involved. The infringer, and those who control and benefit from its infringing
activities, can be enjoined and suffer monetary damages. Conversely, a
trademark owner suing an alleged infringer may find its mark held
unenforceable.74

II. LICENSING THE TRADEMARK
Trademark licensing is a process by which the owner of a trademark (the
licensor) grants authority to another person (the licensee) to make and/or
distribute products or services branded with the licensor’s trademark.75 In
exchange for the right to use the licensor’s trademark or service mark, the
licensee usually pays a royalty to the licensor, often based on a percentage of
the licensee’s sales of products or services branded with licensor’s mark.76 A
license can also be issued to a licensee who avails itself of the licensor’s

1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (a trademark case)).
Circuit Courts of Appeal have adopted and applied the Supreme Court’s definition
of “exceptional” from Octane Fitness to trademark cases. See, e.g., Scholz v.
Goudreau, 901 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2018); Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764
F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2014); 4 Pillar Dynasty LLC v. N.Y. & Co., 933 F.3d 202 (2d
Cir. 2019); Verisign, Inc. v. XYZ.COM LLC, 891 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 2014);
SunEarth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., 839 F.3d 1179 (en banc) (per
curiam) (9th Cir. 2016); Ga-Pac. Consumer Prods. LP v. von Drehle Corp., 781
F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 2015).
70. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 427, 437
(1984); Tony Jones Apparel, Inc. v. Indigo USA LLC, No. 03 C 0280, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14649, at *21–22 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2005).
71. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992).
72. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982).
73. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 110 n.15 (2d Cir. 2010);
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 164 (4th Cir. 2012); Hard Rock
Cafe Licensing Corp., 995 F.2d at 1150; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 27 (AM. L. INST. 1995).
74. See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
75. Trademark Licensing: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
http://www.upcounsel.com/trademark-licensing [https://perma.cc/BE3E-NPAB].
76. Id.
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services.77 For example, an advertising agent that syndicates its ads
throughout the country by region and authorizes use of a mark it claims
ownership of to each licensee for as long as the licensee uses the advertising
services of the advertising agency. Licensing makes sense because a
trademark is an indicator of quality, not just the source of goods sold under a
mark.78 A consumer of trademarked goods expects that the quality of those
goods is consistent regardless of the seller.79
Professor McCarthy explained brand extension by licensing and the need
for quality control:
Brand extension is not limited to high fashion. Well-known tool maker
STANLEY had never made ladders, but consumer research showed
that ladders were a natural extension for the brand. So Stanley licensed
Werner, the largest ladder maker in the U.S. to make and sell
STANLEY branded ladders. As an article in the New York Times
observed: “What you are trusting, though, isn’t Stanley workers in
Stanley factors [sic] upholding Stanley traditions and values under the
watchful eye of Stanley managers. What you’re trusting is Stanley’s
recognition that a badly made ladder with the Stanley name on it could
be highly damaging to the Stanley brand. You are trusting Stanley’s
recognition of the value of its brand and its competence in defending
that value.”80 In legal terminology, in such a brand extension license,
the consumer is trusting that the trademark owner is in control of the
nature and quality of the licensed goods.81

Trademark licensing can be of substantial benefit to the licensor and the
licensee because the brand can be extended into new categories, distribution
channels, and geographic markets with minimal investment.82 There are
benefits for each party to a trademark license. The licensee can provide
supplementary marketing support, the licensor can benefit by allowing
trademark use and protection to extend to a category of the licensee’s goods,
that may be different than the licensor’s, and the licensor will receive from
the licensee the payment of royalties.83

77. Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983).
78. Gallo v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., No. CV-F-10-411 LJO JLT, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10629, at *22–23 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012).
79. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 18:40.
80. Rob Walker, Can a Dead Brand Live Again, N.Y. TIMES ( May18, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/magazine/18rebranding-t.html
[https://perma.cc/V4M7-2BYS].
81. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 18:40.
82. Derrick Daye, 10 Benefits of Brand Licensing, BRANDING STRATEGY
INSIDER (Oct. 3, 2010), https://www.brandingstrategyinsider.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/PK6Y-C5Y9].
83. Id.
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And while it is certainly advisable that the license be written and signed,
a trademark license need not be written; it can be oral, or it can be implied
from the circumstances of use.84 A properly-drawn license agreement should
set out in sufficient detail all of the rights and obligations of the licensee and
the licensor.85 These details include identification of the parties, a description
of the trademark licensed, exactly how it may be employed by the licensee
and on what goods, an explanation of who has the obligation to police thirdparty uses of the licensed mark, the territory in which the mark can be used,
royalties payable and the method of calculation, quality control requirements,
term, assignability, duration of the license, termination, and renewal rights.86

A. Licensee Estoppel
Licensee estoppel is an equitable doctrine whereby a trademark
licensee87 is prohibited from enjoying the benefits afforded by the license
agreement to which it is a party, while at the same time attempting to establish
that the trademark licensed under the agreement is not valid or that the licensor
has lost, or never had, rights in the licensed mark.88 In addition to the license
terms enumerated above, a wise licensor will contractually prohibit its
licensee from challenging or contesting its ownership of the licensed mark or
the mark’s validity. “Such a provision is merely a restatement of the common
law doctrine of licensee estoppel, pursuant to which a trademark licensee is
estopped from contesting his licensor’s trademark rights or the validity of the
licensed mark.”89
Jerome Gilson summarized the rationale that created licensee estoppel:
By entering into the license agreement, the licensee recognizes the
licensor’s ownership of the mark and, by implication, covenants not to
challenge the licensor’s rights. This implied covenant also estops the
licensee from claiming that the licensor abandoned its rights by failing
to exercise adequate quality control during the term of the license.
Thus, in an infringement action against a terminated licensee that

84. Id.; Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 824 (3d Cir.
2006).
85. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.07[1] (2020).
86. Id.
87. Licensee estoppel does not generally apply to patent or copyright
licensing. Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130,
135 (2d Cir. 2003).
88. John C. Flood of Va., Inc. v. John C. Flood, Inc., 642 F.3d 1105, 1111
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Beach Mart, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 784 F. App’x 118, 127
(4th Cir. 2019) (recognizing, “as an equitable doctrine, however licensee estoppel
generally will not be applied by a Court if doing so would cause an inequitable
result”).
89. LALONDE, supra note 85, at § 6.07[7]; John C. Flood of Va., 642 F.2d at
1111.
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refuses to stop using the mark, the licensee may not challenge the
licensor’s ownership or claim abandonment on facts that occurred
before the agreement was terminated.90

A corporate alter ego of the licensee can also be estopped from
challenging the licensor’s ownership of the mark or its validity.91 At least one
federal district court, however, has ruled that a parent entity, a shareholder, or
an agent of the licensee is not prevented under the doctrine of licensee
estoppel from challenging the licensor’s claim to the mark.92
In John C. Flood of Virginia, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit examined licensee estoppel from the licensor’s perspective of
protecting its mark, nakedly licensed, from infringers.93 It began by stating,
“Consequently, where the licensor fails to exercise adequate quality control
over the licensee, ‘a court may find that the trademark owner has abandoned
the trademark, in which case the owner would be estopped from asserting
rights to the trademark.’”94 In that case, however, the licensor was faced with
a challenge by a licensee and not a third party.95 Acknowledging that the D.C.
Circuit has never explicitly recognized the doctrine of licensee estoppel, the
court reviewed decisions from other circuits on the topic and found that
application of the doctrine lacked uniformity regarding when and under what
circumstances courts applied licensee estoppel.96
The Eighth Circuit follows what it described as the “long settled
principle of law that a licensee of a trademark or tradename may not set up
any adverse claim in it as against its licensor.”97 Other circuits, however, have
permitted a trademark licensee to challenge a licensor’s rights in its mark, but

90. LALONDE, supra note 85, at § 6.07[7].
91. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 650 F.3d 1139, 1150
(8th Cir. 2011).
92. Papercraft Corp. v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 727, 728
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
93. The court examined the licensing contract and weighed the benefits
reaped by the licensees and found the doctrine of licensee estoppel existed to
prevent a licensee from enjoying “the benefits afforded by the license agreement
while simultaneously urging that the trademark which forms the basis of the
agreement is void.” John C. Flood of Va., Inc., 642 F.3d at 1111.
94. Id. at 1108 (quoting Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc.,
289 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2002)).
95. See id. at 1111.
96. Id. at 1110–11. Despite the lack of uniformity which may permit the
courts to elect not to apply the equitable doctrine of licensee estoppel, due to the
decades of benefit reaped by the licensee and the delay in raising any challenge
to the licensor’s ownership of the mark the Court found “the equities, no matter
how balanced, weigh in favor of applying licensee estoppel here.” Id. at 1111.
97. Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 561 F.2d 1275, 1279 (quoting
Pac. Supply Coop. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch. Inc., 318 F.2d 894, 908 (9th Cir.
1963)).
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only based on facts that arose after the license expired.98 The Second Circuit
has been more permissive, holding that every claim of licensee estoppel
should be evaluated by balancing the public interests against the licensor’s
private interests.99 In so holding, it adopted the balancing test the U.S.
Supreme Court applied in Lear to determine whether a patent licensee should
be permitted to challenge its licensor’s patent rights.100 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit has limited the defense of licensee estoppel where the results would
be inequitable.101 The Fifth Circuit has held that “[f]ailure to exercise such
control and supervision for a significant period of time may estop the
trademark owner from challenging the use of the mark and business which the
licensee has developed during the period of such unsupervised use.”102 In
short, there is no consistency among the circuits.
The Supreme Court of New York, a trial court sitting in New York
County, has taken another approach to the question of whether a licensee
could attack its licensor’s rights in a mark on the basis of naked licensing.103
While the court did not refute that the application of licensee estoppel would
prevent the RITZ licensee from challenging the licensor’s ownership of the
mark, it recognized that the cases the licensor cited to support licensee
estoppel “do not hold that the licensee is estopped from asserting that the
licensing agreement itself is void as against public policy because it purports
to grant a naked license.”104 In other words, the court held that regardless of
the parties’ contract language, a licensee to a naked license can challenge the
license as void, and in so doing avoid licensee estoppel.105 Finally, courts
appear to draw a material distinction between a licensee and a third party
raising the defense of abandonment as the outcome of naked licensing,
reasoning that equity disallows a licensee to benefit from the use of its
licensor’s mark while simultaneously challenging the validity of the mark.
Equity is not offended by a third party making such an argument.106

98. Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); WCVBTV v. Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1991); Prof’l Golfers Ass’n
of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1975).
99. Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130,
136–37 (2d Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 137 (adopting the licensee estoppel test for patents set forth in Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins. 395 U.S. 653 (1969)).
101. Beach Mart, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 784 F. Appx. 118, 127 (4th Cir.
2019).
102. Sheila’s Shine Prods. v. Sheila Shines, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 124 (5th Cir.
1973); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir.
1962).
103. See Ritz Assocs. v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 230 N.Y.S.2d 408, 411 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
104. Id. at 428.
105. Id.
106. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 18:63.
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B. True Competition in Ideas Which do not Merit Patent Protection
As stated earlier in this Article, patent licensees, as a general rule, are
not estopped from attacking the validity of a patent licensed by the patent
holder. If a licensee can establish invalidity of the licensed patent, it may
avoid paying royalties to its licensor.107 This enlightened view espoused by
the Supreme Court regarding the inapplicability of licensee estoppel in a
patent case is a new development. As recently as 1950, the Supreme Court,
in Hazeltine Research, invoked licensee estoppel to deny a licensee the
opportunity to claim that it had licensed, and was paying royalties for, an idea
that was already in the public domain because the patented idea was not
patentable.108 In Lear, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider
whether the estoppel rule set forth in Hazeltine was still appropriate in view
of the Court’s “recent decisions emphasizing the strong federal policy
favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection.”109
The Court in Lear, reviewing its own history of enforcing licensee
estoppel in patent cases, held that its 1891 decision in St. Paul Plow Works,
“often cited as supporting the estoppel doctrine[,] points clearly in the
opposite direction.”110 The St. Paul Plow Works decision failed to “even
question the right of the lower courts to admit the licensee’s evidence showing
that the potential device was not novel.”111 Instead, in St. Paul Plow Works,
a unanimous court – even though the lower court had been presented with
conflicting evidence of novelty – failed to reverse the lower court’s decision
upholding the validity of the patent.112
In 1892, one year following the unanimous decision in St. Paul Plow
Works, the Supreme Court again considered the question of licensee estoppel
in a patent matter.113 In Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, the Court “found the
doctrine of patent estoppel so inequitable that it refused to grant an injunction
to enforce a licensee’s promise never to contest the validity of the underlying
patent.”114 The basis of its decision was public policy:
It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed
by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention
should be protected in his monopoly; and it is a serious question

107. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969).
108. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836
(1950), overruled in part by Lear, 395 U.S. at 653.
109. Lear, 395 U.S. at 656.
110. Id. at 663.
111. Id.
112. Id.; St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 140 U.S. 184, 197–98 (1891).
113. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233 (1892).
114. Lear, 395 U.S. at 663 (discussing Pope Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. at 234).
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whether public policy permits a man to barter away beforehand his
right to defend unjust actions or classes of actions. . .115

Yet in 1905, only thirteen years later, the Court invoked licensee
estoppel in a patent case without consideration of its holding in Pope Mfg.
Co.116 The licensee estoppel doctrine was not considered again by the Court
until Hazeltine Research, which “declared, without prolonged analysis, that
licensee estoppel was ‘the general rule.’ In so holding, the majority ignored
the teachings of a series of decisions this Court had rendered during the 45
years since Harvey had been decided.”117 By the time Hazeltine Research
was decided, the patent licensee estoppel doctrine had been so eroded it could
not be considered the general rule but was evoked in “an ever-narrowing set
of circumstances.”118
While many licensing agreements prohibit the licensee, whether patent,
trademark, or copyright, from attacking the licensor’s claim of ownership or
the validity of the licensed product, the enforcement of that contract provision
must give way to federal policies, at least in the case of patents and
copyrights.119 Lear instructs:
The parties’ contract, however, is no more controlling on this issue that
is the State’s doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in contract
principles. The decisive question is whether overriding federal
policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be required
to continue to pay royalties during the time they are challenging patent
validity in the courts. It seems to us that such a requirement would be
inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.120

The holding in Lear was based on what the Court described as a strong
federal policy favoring the ability of the public to freely use ideas in the public
domain by not requiring a licensee to pay for information that is available
without cost due to the invalidity or expiration of a patent.121 In other words,
strong policy supports the public interests over the individual patent holder’s
ability to enforce questionable contract rights. As the Court in Pope Mfg. Co.,
observed: “Ordinarily the law leaves to parties the right to make such contracts
as they please, demanding, however, that they shall not require either party to
do an illegal thing, and that they shall not be against public policy or in
restraint of trade.”122
115. Pope Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. at 234.
116. See United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310, 315, 317 (1905).
117. Lear, 395 U.S. at 664 (internal citations omitted) (discussing Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827, 899 (1950)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 673.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 674.
122. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233 (1892).
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The doctrine of licensee estoppel has been applied in copyright cases as
well.123 Prior decisions enforced this doctrine to prevent copyright licensees
from challenging the ownership of their licensors’ copyrights.124 In 1987, the
Seventh Circuit addressed the validity of a clause in a license agreement by
which the copyright licensee covenanted to not contest the licensor’s
ownership or the validity of its copyright in Saturday Evening Post v.
Rumbleseat.125 With consideration of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lear,
Judge Posner held such clauses will be enforced unless doing so carries with
it antitrust implications and results in restraint of trade, writing: “We hold that
a no-contest clause in a copyright licensing agreement is valid unless shown
to violate antitrust law.”126 The holding was made specific to a negotiated
contract clause and not a “doctrine that in effect reads a no-contest clause into
every licensing agreement.”127 Still, the result might well have been to place
the individual interests of the licensor ahead of the public’s interests, for there
should be no payment for expressions which are freely available to anyone.
In Lear, the Court ignored the licensing agreement the parties had
entered into, holding that their contract was “no more controlling on this issue
than is the State’s doctrine of estoppel, which is also rooted in contract
principles.”128 The narrow holding in Saturday Evening Post, that licensee
estoppel will not be enforced only where embodied in a contract and doing so
will result in a violation of antitrust laws, makes little sense when contrasted
with Lear and its clearly enunciated intent to protect the public interests.129
First, the Seventh Circuit distinguished a contract from no contract, upholding
the contracted-for no-contest obligation and questioning application of the
equitable doctrine when no contract clause recognized it. Second, the Seventh
Circuit held the only circumstance that warrants a challenge of a contractedfor no-contest clause is where enforcement will result in restraint of trade
under antitrust laws.130 The prevention of inflated pricing caused by restraint
of trade and the prevention of consumer confusion caused by naked licensing
are laudable and important public policy goals.131
Judge Posner, in Saturday Evening Post, declared the need to balance
the pros and cons of the no-contest clause in each case.132 While he thought
123. See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Columbia Graphophone Co., 263 F. 354,
357 (2d Cir. 1920); Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
124. See, e.g., Ricordi, 263 F. at 357; Fitch, 20 F. Supp. at 315.
125. 3 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.15[B][2] (5th ed. 2020)
(citing Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1556 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
126. Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191,
1200 (7th Cir. 1987).
127. Id.
128. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969).
129. Saturday Evening Post, 816 F.2d at 1200–01; Lear, 395 U.S. at 670–71.
130. Saturday Evening Post, 816 F.2d at 1200.
131. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3–4 (1946); Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
132. Saturday Evening Post, 816 F.2d at 1200.
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the balancing was best done under antitrust law133 and declined to hold such
a clause invalid except for antitrust reasons, Judge Posner’s opinion may be
substantially too narrow in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Lear, in
which it expressed “the strong federal policy favoring free competition in
ideas which do not merit patent protection.”134 These ideas, the Court held,
include ideas in the public domain.135 Trademarks, once abandoned, no
longer serve their function as designators of source and conveyors of
information, both of value to the consumer, and they enter the public
domain.136
Judge Feinberg of the Second Circuit understood the need to assess
public policy and protect against public injury by abandoning equitable
principles when enforcing agreements related to intellectual property. He
wrote:
Even when courts have not expressly applied the Lear test, they have
recognized that agreements related to intellectual property necessarily
involve the public interest and have enforced such agreements only to
the extent that enforcement does not result in a public injury. Thus,
the First Circuit in T&T Manufacturing Co. v. A.T. Cross Co. asked
“whether there is any significant harm to the public” before holding
that a settlement agreement related to trademarks was enforceable.137

Patents and copyrights are creatures of federal law,138 with origins in the
United States Constitution.139 A trademark is a creation of federal statute,140
numerous state statutes, and the common law. There is no good basis to not
seek the public interest behind each and to use that public interest to allow a
licensee to challenge its licensor’s rights.
The public interest is a core concern of all law, be it statutory or common
law. Allowing a licensee to challenge a licensor’s rights in a mark is
irrefutably consistent with the greater public interest. No good reason exists
not to allow it; to the contrary, failure to protect the right to challenge the
licensor does violence to the elementary purpose of the law.
While there are similarities to be drawn between patents, copyrights, and
trademarks, there are also distinctions to be seen in the damage caused by the
infringement of the rights and protections afforded by each. Generally, if an
133. Id.
134. Lear, 395 U.S. at 656.
135. Id. at 674.
136. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410,
412 (7th Cir. 1994).
137. Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130,
136 (2d Cir. 2003); T & T Mfg. Co. v. A. T. Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533, 538 (1st
Cir. 1978).
138. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (2018); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2018).
139. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2018).
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item is made pursuant to the patent or a piece is reproduced pursuant to the
copyright, the consuming public is not deceived because they are still getting
the product that they are paying for. Under these circumstances, the owner of
patent or copyright is losing its ability to exclusively control the use of the
invention or the expression.141 The remedy for such infringement is usually
monetary damages in the form of lost profits.142 A trademark, on the other
hand, tricks the consumer into believing that a product originated with one
vendor while being induced to purchase the product from another vendor,
thereby deceiving the public and diminishing the good will of the rightful
owner of the trademark.143 Monetary damages do not repair the damage to
reputation that such consumer confusion can cause, so often times both
equitable relief and monetary damages are an appropriate remedy.144

III. QUALITY CONTROL AND THE TRADEMARK LICENSE
When licensing a trademark, the licensor takes on certain obligations,
the most important of which is to control the quality of the goods or services
provided by its licensee as associated with the mark.145 There is no rule that
trademark proprietors must insure ‘high quality’ goods or that ‘high quality’
permits unsupervised licensing. ‘Kentucky Fried Chicken’ is a valid mark
(citation omitted), though neither that chain nor any other fast-food franchise
receives a star (or even a mention in the Guide Michelin). The sort of
supervision required for a trademark license is the sort that produces
consistent quality.146
Understanding this obligation of a licensor requires examining what
quality control means, why it matters, who benefits from it, and what happens
when the licensor fails to fulfill this obligation. To be valid, a trademark
license must include quality control.147
As set forth above, trademark owners may determine that the most
expeditious or effective way to exploit their marks is to license to third parties
the right to manufacture and/or sell goods or services branded with their
mark.148 This practice, however, is not without rules and restrictions.

141. James Astrachan, Who Will Protect the Consumers of Trademarked.
Goods?, 46 UNIV. OF BALT. L. REV. 375, 390 (2017) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)
(2012); 17 U.S.C. § 106).
142. Id. at 376.
143. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 2:9; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992); S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946).
144. Astrachan, supra note 141, at 377.
145. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 18:38.
146. Eva’s Bridal Ltd. V. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., 639 F.3d 788 (7th Cir.
2011).
147. Dzhunaydov v. Emerson Elec. Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 34747
(E.D. N.Y. March 17, 2016).
148. Id.
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As a general matter, trademark owners have a duty to control the
quality of their trademarks. McCarthy § 18:48. “It is well-established
that ‘[a] trademark owner may grant a license and remain protected
provided quality control of the goods and the services sold under the
trademark by the licensee is maintained.’”149

The court explained in Moore Bus. Forms that “naked licensing” occurs
where the licensor “fails to exercise adequate quality control over the
licensee.”150 When this occurs, the result may be that the trademark no longer
serves as a symbol of source and quality, so the mark is abandoned, and it
slips into the public domain. Naked licensing is objectionable for reasons of
public policy because it is considered “inherently deceptive and constitutes
abandonment of any rights to the trademark by the licensor.”151
“Consequently, where the licensor fails to exercise adequate quality control
over the licensee, ‘a court may find that the trademark owner has abandoned
the trademark, in which case the owner would be estopped from asserting
rights to the trademark.’”152
In determining whether a licensor has engaged in naked licensing, a
court will ordinarily first examine the language of the licensing agreement to
ascertain whether the parties have agreed that the licensor retains a right to
inspect the goods and services sold by the licensee under the mark in order to
determine if they conform to the goods and services sold, or previously sold,
by the licensor under the mark.153 The omission of a clause that allows
licensors to inspect the quality of the licensee’s goods or services can support
a finding of naked licensing.154 Absent an express license agreement that
controls the licensee’s use of the licensed mark, there is little basis on which
a court should find that the licensor has rights to inspect and supervise the

149. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir.
2010) (quoting Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d
589, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2002))..
150. Barcamerica, 289 F.3d at 596.
151. Id. at 598 (quoting First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, No. C-89-4106
MHP, 1990 WL 300321 at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 1990)).
152. Id. at 596 (quoting Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489
(5th Cir. 1992)).
153. Id. at 596–97 (finding licensor engaged in naked licensing where
language of licensing agreement contained no “controls or restrictions with
respect to quality of goods,” and despite express language, licensor and licensee
did not “have the type of close working relationship required to establish adequate
quality control in the absence of a formal agreement”).
154. Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding licensor engaged in naked licensing where no express contractual right
to inspect or supervise licensee’s operations existed and licensor did not exercise
“sufficient control over its licensee”).
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licensee’s use of the mark.155 “The only effective way to protect the public
where a trademark is used by a licensee is to place on the licensor the
affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his
licensees.”156
Failure to provide quality control can harm the consuming public as this
failure can serve to misrepresent to the consumers of those products the
connection the products have with the trademark owner and the quality of the
products. This is because a naked license may result in the use, by an
authorized licensee, of a mark that does not identify goods and services under
the control of the licensor. The result is an involuntary abandonment by the
licensor of its rights in the mark.157 The question arises, who can assert that
the licensor has abandoned its mark?

A. Why is Quality Control Essential?
A principal purpose of a trademark is to indicate the source of the goods
sold under the mark.158 An equally important purpose is to establish for the
consumer a consistent source of quality – that is, the product sold by a licensee
under the licensed mark will be consistent with the quality of the product sold
by the licensor of the mark as well as any other of the licensor’s licensees,
should there be more than one. 159 It matters not whether the quality of the
licensor’s product is high or low; the consumer of the licensee’s product,
relying on the trademark to aid selection, has the right to expect consistency
between the licensor’s and the licensee’s products.160 A trademark license
must assure, at minimum, that goods are consistent, whether originating from
the licensor or the licensee.161 While trademarks licensed to third parties for
their use still indicate the source of goods, the purpose behind quality control
is to assure uniform standards of quality.162
A consumer of trademarked goods is the beneficiary of consistent quality
among products bearing the brand of the licensor and is entitled to expect that
the licensor is in control of the quality of the goods sold bearing the mark,
regardless of by whom – licensor or licensee.163 The authorized use of a
155. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 516–17 (9th
Cir. 2010).
156. Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 823 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted).
157. Id.; 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 18:48 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995)).
158. Gallo v. Proximo Spirits, Inc., No. CV-F-10-411 LJO JLT, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10629, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012).
159. Id.
160. Eva’s Bridal, Ltd. v. Halanick Enterprises, 639 F.3d 788, 790 (7th Cir.
2011).
161. Id.
162. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 18:40.
163. Id.
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licensor’s mark indicates to consumers that the products sold under the mark
have “been delivered according to all quality control guidelines enforced by
the manufacturer.”164
The results of a licensor’s failure to assure its licensee’s quality control
can be devastating to the licensor. As to the duty of a trademark licensor to
control the manner in which its licensee produces or distributes the product
sold under the licensed mark, Judge Posner held:
The owner of a trademark has a duty to ensure the consistency of the
trademarked good or service. If he does not fulfill this duty, he forfeits
the trademark. The purpose of the trademark, after all, is to identify a
good or service to the consumer, and identity implies consistency and
a correlative duty to make sure that the good or service really is of
consistent quality, i.e., really is the same good or service.165

Judge Posner recognized that a properly used trademark confers an
economic benefit to the consumers, holding that “[t]he economic function of
a trademark is to provide the consuming public with a concise and
unequivocal signal of the trademarked product’s source and character, and
that function is thwarted if the quality and uniformity of the trademarked
product are allowed to vary significantly without notice to the consumer.”166
Judge Posner’s vision of a trademark’s function sounds very much like
the strong public interests set forth by the Supreme Court in Lear as the basis
for not enforcing licensee estoppel, although not necessarily related to a “full
and free” competition167 or to antitrust. Nevertheless, Judge Posner’s concern
for the consumer of trademarked goods is echoed by Judge Feinberg, who
held:
[I]n the trademark context, as already noted: “[a] dealer’s good will is
protected . . . in order that the purchasing public may not be enticed
into buying A’s product when it wants B’s product.” Thus, agreements
that allow the continued use of confusingly similar trademarks injure
the public, and the important issue in litigation over trademark
contracts is the public confusion that might arise from enforcing the
contract.168

164. Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 108 (4th Cir.
1991).
165. Gorenstein Enterprises v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th
Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
166. Draeger Oil Co., Inc. v. Uno-Ven Co., 314 F.3d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002)).
167. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
168. Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M & M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130,
138 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting T & T Mfg. Co. v. A. T. Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533,
538 (1st Cir. 1978).
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As a trademark functions to provide valuable information to the
consumer, and confers an economic benefit, the failure of a mark’s owner to
control the quality of its licensee’s products sold under the mark can deceive
consumers who rely on the authenticity of the licensee’s product to their
economic detriment.169 A licensee’s conduct in failing to conform to
supervision of quality imposed by a licensor under a license agreement is so
serious as to subject the licensee to claims of breach of contract and even
trademark infringement.170

B. The Consumers’ Interest in Licensor’s Quality Control
The licensor of a trademark can clearly be harmed by the failure of its
licensee to adhere to the licensor’s standards of quality associated with the
licensed mark and the product it brands, because the consumer of those goods
may be confused, deceived, and put off. “Distribution of a product that does
not meet the trademark holder’s quality control standards may result in the
devaluation of the mark by tarnishing its image”171 or the mark may even be
considered abandoned.172 As referenced earlier in this Article, the licensor
has a cause of action against its licensee who fails to adhere to the licensor’s
imposed quality standards, but, generally speaking, the consumer does not.
This is because under the Act, standing does not extend to permit a consumer
to sue for the deceptive trade practices of a seller or manufacturer of goods or
services.173
The requirement that a licensor impose quality control on its licensee is
intended to ensure consistency between the products bearing the licensed
mark sold by the licensee and the licensor.174 Protection of the public is a
chief reason for the affirmative duty imposed on a licensor to police the
manner in which its licensee employs its licensed marks.
Courts have long imposed upon trademark licensors a duty to oversee
the quality of licensee’s products. The rationale for this requirement
is that marks are treated by purchasers as an indication that the
169. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir.
1959) (holding that the failure of a licensor to control and supervise the operations
of its licensee may result in consumers of the licensee’s products being
“unwittingly deceived”); Broeg v. Duchaine, 67 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Mass. 1946).
170. See Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 212 F.
Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (holding licensee breached contract and infringed on a
trademark where licensee manufactured and sold products which did not meet the
agreed quality and standards).
171. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018).
173. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 U.S. 118, 132
(2014); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).
174. Gorenstein Enterprises v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th
Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
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trademark owner is associated with the product. Customers rely upon
the owner’s reputation when they select the trademarked goods. If a
trademark owner allows licensees to depart from its quality standards,
the public will be misled, and the trademark will cease to have utility
as an informational device.175

Because the consumers of licensed goods are not in a position to uncover
deceptive uses of trademarks, the burden must fall on the licensor to supervise
its licensee. A trademark licensor should be placed at risk if it fails to take
steps to prevent its licensees from misusing its licensed marks.
[U]nless the licensor exercises supervision and control over the
operations of its licensees the risk that the public will be unwittingly
deceived will be increased and this is precisely what the Act is in part
designed to prevent. Clearly the only effective way to protect the
public where a trademark is used by licensees is to place on the licensor
the affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities
of his licensees.176

Where the naked licensing results from the failure of a licensor to impose
quality control standards or monitor the quality of its licensee’s goods, the
consumer is harmed, and it is not equitable for the licensee to be estopped
from challenging its licensor’s ownership after the licensor has failed to
engage in its affirmative duty to police in a reasonable manner how the
licensee has used the mark. In balancing the interests of the public against
those of the licensor, the public should come out on top, particularly when it
is the licensor who is in the best position to prevent confusion and harm to the
consumer.

C. Naked Licensing Results in Abandonment of Trademark Rights
Because the naked licensing of a mark deceives the public and conveys
a false and deceptive message to consumers, it can result in abandonment of
the mark.177 This occurs, in part, because a licensor who fails to monitor the
quality of a licensee’s goods and/or services likewise fails to abide by the
inherent purpose of a trademark “to function as a symbol of quality and

175. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted); see also FreecycleSunnyvale v.
Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515–16 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that naked
licensing is inherently deceptive); Heaton Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co.,
387 F.2d 477, 485 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding that a licensor’s failure to control the
quality of its licensee’s products permits “a deception of the public”).
176. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir.
1959) (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946)).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2018); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 18:48.
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controlled source.”178 As a result of naked trademark licensing, “a court can
find that the trademark owner has abandoned the trademark, in which case the
owner would be estopped from asserting rights to the trademark.”179 This is
considered an involuntary forfeiture of trademark rights, and a subjective
intent to abandon the mark need not be established.180
A comment to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition explains
why a licensor who engages in naked licensing may suffer the fate of
trademark abandonment:
An uncontrolled or ‘naked’ license authorizes use of the trademark on
goods or services for which the trademark owner cannot offer a
meaningful assurance of quality. When the trademark owner fails to
exercise reasonable control over the use of the mark by a licensee, the
presence of the mark on the licensee’s goods or services misrepresents
their connection to the trademark owner since the mark no longer
identifies goods and services that are under the control of the owner of
the mark. Although prospective purchasers may continue to perceive
the designation as a trademark, the courts have traditionally treated an
erosion of the designations’ capacity for accurate identification
resulting from uncontrolled licensing as a loss of trademark
significant, thus subjecting the owner of the mark to a claim of
abandonment under the rule stated in [the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition].”181

Because naked licensing is considered inherently deceptive and results
in abandonment of the trademark by the licensor, the licensor loses all rights
it has in the trademark.182 In other words, the licensor’s insufficient control
of how the mark is used by its licensee can result in the forfeiture of the mark.
A trademark owner does not, however, abandon its trademark through naked
licensing unless the particular circumstances involving the licensing suggest
that the public – those consumers and potential consumers of products sold

178. Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589,
596 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:48 (4th ed. 2001)).
179. Id. (quoting Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir.
1992)). However, if the licensee is unable to assert the affirmative defense of
abandonment due to licensee estoppel, there would appear no barrier to the
licensor’s infringement action against its licensee.
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Barcamerica, 289 F.3d at 596 (quoting 3 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:48
(4th ed. 2001)).
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33, cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1995).
182. Eureka Water Co. v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., No. CIV-07-988-M,
2009 WL 5083577 at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2009)
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under the trademark – will be deceived.183 These circumstances may exist
where the licensor is familiar with its licensee’s efforts to control quality and
relies on these efforts.184 A close working relationship between the licensor
and its licensee can defeat a claim of naked licensing and avoid the fate of
trademark abandonment.185 But courts have held that naked licensing will
create a situation that fosters public deception and abandonment is the
result.186

IV. TRADEMARK LICENSEE ESTOPPEL
There are many statutory defenses available to a trademark defendant.
For example, abandonment, that the mark is merely descriptive, that the mark
was registered based on a misrepresentation to the USPTO, that the mark was
used to misrepresent source, the mark was used to violate laws, or that the
mark is functional.187 As well, there are equitable defenses available to the
trademark defendant. These include laches, estoppel and acquiescence.188
Judicial defenses also exist, for example, nominative fair use.189 And,
comparative advertising when a mark is used to describe a competitor’s
product.190 As well, courts have found fair use of another’s mark when used
to “poke fun” at the product sold under the mark.191 A licensee of a trademark

183. Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 738 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir.
2013).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186.See, e.g., FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515–16
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Barcamerica Intern. USA Trust v. Tyfield Imp., Inc., 289
F.3d 589, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[N]aked licensing . . . is inherently
deceptive”)); Standfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir.
1995); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48–49 (9th Cir. 1971);
Heaton Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477, 485 (8th Cir. 1967);
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959);
Bos. Dental Grp., LLC. v. Affordable Care, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-01636-RFBCWH, No. 216CV01636RFBCWH, 2018 WL 1566331 at *7 (D. Nev. Mar. 29,
2018); Cornaby’s LLC v. Carnet, LLC, No. 214CV00462JNPDBP, 2017 WL
3503669 at *8–9 (D. Utah Aug. 15, 2017); Halo Mgmt., LLC v. Interland, Inc.,
No. C-03-1106 MHP, No. C-03-1106 MHP, 2004 WL 1781013 at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2004) (quoting First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, No. C-89-4106
MHP, 1990 WL 300321 at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 1990) (finding the practice of
naked licensing to be inherently deceptive)); Broeg v. Duchaine, 67 N.E.2d 466,
468 (Mass. 1946).
187. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2018).
188. Id.
189. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308–10
(9th Cir. 1992).
190. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 565–67 (9th Cir. 1968).
191. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 901–03 (9th Cir. 2002).
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“who has used a designation under a license from another is ordinarily
estopped from asserting ownership of the designation as against the owner.”192
Thus, licensee estoppel can prevent a licensee from challenging the validity
of a mark on the basis that the mark is not distinctive,193 or that the licensor’s
registration is fraudulent.194
The doctrine of licensee estoppel has been applied by the courts to
prevent a licensee from asserting that its licensor has abandoned its mark due
to the licensor’s failure to assert and exercise quality control measures over
the licensee’s use. This result has followed despite the holding that where “a
trademark owner engages in naked licensing, without any control over the
quality of goods produced by the licensee, such a practice is inherently
deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any rights to the trademark by the
licensor.”195
A third party can challenge a licensor’s rights in the mark on the basis of
naked licensing and the resulting abandonment, but the general rule is that the
trademark licensee cannot do so.196
The licensee is estopped from claiming any rights against the licensor
which are inconsistent with the terms of the license. This is true even
after the license expires. He is estopped from contesting the validity
of the mark, . . . or challenging the license agreement as void or
against public policy, e.g., because it granted a naked license. But he
may challenge the licensor’s title to the mark based on events which
occurred after the license expired.197

The doctrine of trademark licensee estoppel is not absolute with all
courts; some courts recognize an intermediate path between an absolute bar
to a licensee’s challenge of validity or ownership and allowing the challenge
under some circumstances.198 Several courts have held that when a licensor
engages in naked licensing, the licensee may invoke the naked licensing
defense as a form of estoppel where the licensor alleges the licensee engaged
in infringing activities.199 Allowing the licensee to invoke a naked licensing
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. d (AM. L.
INST. 1995).
193. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. King Nut Co., 477 F.2d 326, 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1973).
194. Levine v. McDonald’s Corp., No. Civ. 77-601 Phx. WPC, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11771, at *10 (D. Ariz. June 12, 1979).
195. Stanfield, 52 F.3d at 871 (quoting Stenquist, 1990 WL 300321 at *3).
196. Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000).
197. Id. (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:63 (4th ed. 2000)).
198. Pro. Golfers Ass’n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 671
(5th Cir. 1975).
199. Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1075 n.7 (5th Cir.
1997); Sheila’s Shine Prods. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 123–24 (5th Cir.
1973); Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 318 F. Supp. 2d 923, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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defense to defend against allegations of infringing activities is less common,
but has happened.200 For example, in Sheila’s Shine Products, the Ninth
Circuit held that “[f]ailure to exercise such control and supervision for a
significant period of time may estop the trademark owner from challenging
the use of the mark and business which the licensee has developed during the
period of such unsupervised use.”201
Some courts have held that, in cases involving naked licensing, a
licensee may challenge the license agreement as void or against public policy
“based on events that occurred after the license expired.”202 Otherwise, the
licensee may not claim rights against its licensor that “are inconsistent with
the terms of the license,” even after the license expires.203 This includes a
challenge on the grounds the license is void or against public policy.204 One
court has held that a licensee may raise a naked license defense against its
licensor where the challenged actions are instances of naked licensing to third
parties.205
In Professional Golfers, the Fifth Circuit held that by entering into a
licensing agreement, the licensee recognized the licensor’s ownership of the
mark, but questioned whether, once the license agreement ends, the licensee
is forever barred from challenging the licensor’s ownership and the validity
of the mark.206 In raising this query, the court examined decisions holding the
licensee is forever barred and decisions finding there is some expiration to the
estoppel.207
Ultimately, the Professional Golfers court held that, following the
expiration of a license for trademark use, the former licensee may challenge
its licensor’s ownership on facts that arose after the license expired:
Thus a licensee affirms his licensor’s ownership of the mark by
entering into the agreement, but the straightjacket effect does not last
interminably. In the present case, however, the facts upon which [the

200. Sheila’s Shine Prods, 486 F.2d at 124.
201. Id.
202. Creative Gifts, Inc., 235 F.3d at 548 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:63 (4th ed. 2000)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Keybab Gyros, Inc. v. Riyad, No. 3:09-0061, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117962, at *22–23 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2009).
206. Pro. Golfers Ass’n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 671
(5th Cir. 1975).
207. Id. (citing Heaton Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477 (8th
Cir. 1967); E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512 (6th Cir.
1943)) as relates to a post-termination bar; and Id. (citing Donald F. Duncan, Inc.
v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965); Bucky v. Sebo, 208 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1953); Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Nat’l Ice Cream Co., 26 F.2d 901 (6th
Cir. 1928)) as relates to no bar, post-termination.
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defendant] relies arose during the course of its ten-year agreement with
the PGA, so it is estopped to argue abandonment.208

The court held that the bar to challenge the licensor’s ownership of a
mark should not last forever, but it also ruled that where the facts on which
the challenge to the licensor’s ownership occurred during the license, the
challenge should be barred. This distinction is lost on any consumer who is
misled by the failure of the licensor to exert quality control over the licensee’s
use of its mark.

A. The Doctrine of Licensee Estoppel is Against Public Policy and
Should be Generally Abandoned
The basis for licensee estoppel has been summarized as follows:
[A] licensee claiming that its own license is a naked license essentially
seeks to benefit from its own misfeasance. By asserting a naked
license defense, the licensee contends that the licensed trademark or
trade name has lost its significance as a source of origin because the
licensor has failed to police the licensee’s operations. Thus, by relying
on its own ability to offer inferior or nonuniform goods and services
under the trademark or trade name, the licensee seeks to free itself of
the constraints imposed by the licensor’s ownership of the trademark
or trade name. Not surprisingly, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition observes that the case for applying licensee estoppel is
strongest in such cases.209

This effort to restrain the licensee based on its own misfeasance,
however, protects only the licensor and not the public. It places the blame
squarely on the licensee and protects the property interests of the licensor, the
party who had always been in the best position to impose and require
adherence to uniform standards.
In Lear, the Supreme Court refused to apply licensee estoppel in a case
of patent licensing, holding that the “parties’ contract, however, is no more
controlling on this issue than is the State’s doctrine of estoppel, which is also
rooted in contract principles.”210 A half-century later, many courts still cling
to the notion that trademark licensee estoppel is appropriate, and that a
licensee should not be permitted to challenge its licensor’s title, or the validity

208. Professional Golfers Assoc., 514 F.2d at 671.
209. L.F.P.IP, Inc. v. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., No. 1:09cv0913 (WOB), 2011
WL 5024356 at *9 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2011), aff'd sub nom. L.F.P.IP, LLC v.
Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., 533 F. App'x 615 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Westco Group,
Inc. v. K.B. & Assocs., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (N.D. Ohio 2016)).
210. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969).
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of its mark, on the basis of its licensor’s commissions and dereliction of its
duty to impose and supervise quality control.211
The Court in Lear framed the decisive issue as “whether overriding
federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be
prohibited from challenging the validity of their licensor’s patents.”212
Federal jurisprudence is full of declarations and holdings that naked licensing
deceives the consumer and is even fraudulent.213 This appears not to be
disputed by any court as a general rule.
The public policy behind proper use of a trademark was clearly stated by
the United States Congress in 1946 as it considered adoption of the Act.214
However, it is the Second Circuit that may have best described the public
policy behind the Act:
The public is hardly in a position to uncover deceptive uses of a
trademark before they occur and will be at best slow to detect them
after they happen. Thus, unless the licensor exercises supervision and
control over the operations of its licensees the risk that the public will
be unwittingly deceived will be increased and this is precisely what
the Act is in part designed to prevent.215

Licensee estoppel is not statutory law; it has developed in the courts as
a product of common law.216 As such, a “court remains free to consider the
particular circumstances of the case . . .”217 As acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in Lear, there are good reasons why courts should be
encouraged to do so and not enforce licensee estoppel:

211. Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000).
212. Lear, 395 U.S. at 673.
213. Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quoting First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, No. C-89-4106 MHP, 1990 WL
300321 at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 1990) (finding naked licensing to be “inherently
deceptive”)). Societe Comptoir De L’Industrie Cotonniere Establissements
Boussac v. Alexander’s Dept. Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1962) (“[A]
bare license is a fraud upon the public and unlawful.”), finding that naked licenses
can defraud the consumer.
214. “[W]hen it is considered that the protection of trade—marks is merely
protection to goodwill, to prevent diversion of trade through misrepresentation,
and the protection of the public against deception, a sound public policy requires
that trade-marks should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given
them.” S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 5–6 (1946).
215. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir.
1959).
216. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 144–45 n.2 (citing
Lear, 395 U.S. at 659).
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. d (AM. L.
INST. 1995).
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Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they
are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and
free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the
public domain. Licensees may often be the only individuals with
enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an
inventor’s discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually
be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification. We think it plain that the technical requirements of
contract doctrine must give way before the demands of the public
interest in the typical situation involving the negotiation of a license
after a patent has issued.218

One might add to the holding in Lear that a trademark licensor’s property
interests are far less important than the public policy served by trademarks in
discerning both source and quality, and that a licensor’s failure to follow the
most basic rules of imposing quality control standards should be held against
the licensor. One could continue and assert that a consumer is without any
standing to bring a trademark action to assert that a licensor has abandoned
the mark by failing to control product quality. If the mark cannot be
challenged by a licensee, a person who may be best positioned to do so, the
licensor is free, perhaps even encouraged, to continue its deception brought
upon unknowing consumers through naked licensing. Clearly, when the
hardships and equities are balanced among the consumer, the licensee, and the
licensor, the licensor should lose, and the consumer should win. Often it will
be the licensee who is best suited to bring about this result. First, because it
is aware of the naked licensing. Second, because absent application of
licensee estoppel, it, and not the consumer, has standing to bring the action.
Third, because it often has the financial means and incentive to do so.
Courts have acknowledged that “[a]s an equitable doctrine, however,
licensee estoppel generally will not be applied by a court if doing so would
cause an inequitable result.”219 Other courts have recognized that agreements,
such as license agreements, related to intellectual property involve the public
interest.220 Few cases, however, have refused to apply the equitable doctrine
of licensee estoppel to ban the licensee’s defense of abandonment based on
naked licensing.221 Where courts have refused to apply the doctrine in
218. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670–71 (1969).
219. Beach Mart, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 784 F. App’x 118, 127 (4th Cir.
2019). See also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham
Ctr. of Contemp. Dance, Inc., 43 F. App’x 408, 414 (2d Cir. 2002); Westco Group,
Inc. v. K.B. & Assocs., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090 (N.D. Ohio 2016); Sturgis
Motorcycle Rally, Inc. v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc, No. CIV. 11-5052, 2013
WL 5424707 at *11–12 (D.S.D. Mar. 6, 2013), report and recommendation
adopted as modified, No. CIV. 11-5052-JLV, 2013 WL 5424702 (D.S.D. Sept.
26, 2013).
220. Idaho Potato Comm’n v. M&M Produce Farm & Sales, 335 F.3d 130,
136 (2d Cir. 2003).
221. E.g., id. at 139.
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trademark cases, they have done so on the basis of protection of the public
interests.222 For example, in Idaho Potato Comm’n, Judge Feinberg held that
the estoppel provision in a certification mark license placed non-quality
control restrictions on sellers of the certified product in contravention of the
mark owner’s obligation not to interfere with a free market for products
meeting the certification’s criteria.223 As held in Lear,224 it may be that only
licensees have the economic ability to challenge the licensor; as well, the court
should undertake review of the public interests implicated by the merits of the
licensee’s challenge.225
Trademark dispute courts that have applied Lear’s balancing test of
public versus private interests have generally enforced licensee estoppel.226
In one case, the public policy behind trademarks – that the public should not
be deceived from buying the wrong product due to deception – gave way to
the principle of contract law that a person should be held to the deal he
made.227

V. LICENSEE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT BAR A LICENSEE FROM
CHALLENGING A LICENSOR’S MARK ON THE GROUNDS OF NAKED
LICENSING
Congressman Fritz Lanham, for whom the Lanham Act was named,
testified in the United States House of Representatives that the purpose of his
namesake bill was to “protect legitimate business and the consumers of this
country.”228 Professor McCarthy agreed, and opined that the first policy
behind the law of unfair competition is the prevention of public deception;
following the public policy comes the protection of a mark owner’s property
rights.229 His opinion is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, Inc.230
Infringement of patents, copyrights, and trademarks all cause monetary
damage and loss, but there is a distinction to be drawn between damage caused
by infringement of a patent or a copyright and the damage caused by
infringement of a trademark. This distinction arises because a patentee or a

222. E.g., id.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).
225. Id. (citing Beer Nuts, Inc. v. King Nut Co., 477 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.
1973)).
226. Id. at 136.
227. MWS Wire Indus., Inc. v. Calif. Fine Wire Co., 797 F.2d 799, 803 (9th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Beer Nuts, Inc., 477 F.2d at 328)).
228. S. Res. 542, 114th Cong. (2016).
229. J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 3:1 (5th ed. 2020).
230. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see also,
Mosley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc. 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003).
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copyright holder in an infringement action has a statutory right to exclusively
control use of the invention or the copyrightable expression and to be
compensated where an infringer makes or sells the patented device or an
infringer reproduces or distributes the copyrighted expression.231
Infringement of a patent or a copyright may result in the loss of a monetary
benefit to the owner thereof, but in either case, a consumer will not be
adversely affected by the infringement.232 If the patent is followed in the
manufacture of an article, or the expression of a copyrighted work is faithfully
copied, it should matter little to the consumer whose product is acquired.233
There is no ground for the consumer to assert it has been deceived.
Trademarks are different than patents and copyrights as trademarks
serve a different purpose than patents and copyrights. In general
terms, trademarks serve to designate a source of goods and services.
Surely to their owners they are valuable intangible assets and must be
protected from infringers. But, within this value, to their owners lies
their core value. Trademarks allow consumers to choose among goods
based on the quality of the goods and the reputation of the source.234

The basic policy behind the law of unfair competition has been described
by Professor McCarthy as, “[t]he interest of the public in not being
deceived.”235 This protection against consumer deception is one of two goals
of modern trademark law that Professor McCarthy identifies; the other is the
protection of an owner’s trademark.236 Professor McCarthy’s opinion is
supported by the Supreme Court case of Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, in which
it held that trademarks allow consumers to discern and select among the goods
and services of the various producers.237 Trademarks “foster competition and
the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good
reputation.”238 The United States Senate’s 1946 Report on the Act read in
part: “The purpose underlying any trademark statute is twofold. One is to
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing
a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which
it asks for and wants to get.”239
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recognizes that a
trademark’s purpose, in large part, is to impart information to a consumer and
231. Astrachan, supra note 141, at 390.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 385, 390.
234. Id. at 390.
235. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 2:1 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers
Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)).
236. Id. at § 2:4.
237. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992).
238. Id. (quoting Park ‘n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985)).
239. S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
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to prevent the consumer from being deceived.240 “On the other hand, if the
licensee’s use is on goods similar or identical to those produced by the
trademark owner, purchasers may be likely to assume that the goods are
actually manufactured by the owner of the mark.”241
The Fourth Circuit has held that “Congress intended the Lanham Act to
protect consumers from confusion in the marketplace. . . .”242 As well as
avoiding confusion by enabling consumers to select their choice of goods by
use of the trademark, trademarks enable the consumer to reduce the cost of
learning about a product.243 This aspect of a trademark can have great value.
As the Senate Report expressed:
Trademarks, indeed, are the essence of competition because they make
possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to
distinguish one from the other.
Trademarks encourage the
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the
good reputation which excellence creates. To protect trademarks,
therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition,
and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation
and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have
created them to those who have not. This is the end to which this bill
is directed.244

Finally, the antitrust laws that formed the basis for the Supreme Court’s
decision not to enforce licensee estoppel in Lear, and its absence in Saturday
Evening Post that caused the Seventh Circuit to enforce licensee estoppel, was
recognized as a competitive measure in at least one trademark decision. In
Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., the Fifth Circuit held that
“[t]he antitrust laws require competition, not piracy. The essence of
competition is the ability of competing products to obtain public recognition
based on their own individual merit.”245

VI. CONCLUSION
Many courts have recognized the public benefit in being able to discern
quality and source through the consuming public’s recognition of a trademark
and its ability to discern the products branded thereby from the products of
240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. c (AM. L. INST.
1995).
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. c (AM. L.
INST. 1995).
242. Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2005).
243. See ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND
PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 190–91 (John
Mahaney & Larry Olsen eds., 2d ed. 1977).
244. S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946).
245. 363 F.2d 945, 954 (5th Cir. 1966).
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another seller. Many courts also recognize that consumers are deceived and
thwarted in these efforts by licensors that engage in naked licensing. The
Supreme Court struck down the licensee estoppel rule in Lear in a patent
context.246 Rarely, however, has Lear’s non-estoppel rule been extended to
trademark cases despite (or perhaps because of) the existence of a different
public policy in protecting consumers from patents that should not have issued
and marks that should be held abandoned.247
By entering a licensing agreement with a licensor, a licensee recognizes
the licensor’s ownership of the mark and, by implication or express language,
covenants not to challenge the licensor’s rights.248 As the Supreme Court
confirmed in Lear, the strong public interest in protecting the consumer
transaction from deception and fraud demands priority over these private
contract principles. Lear’s non-estoppel rule should therefore be extended to
the trademark arena of naked licensing.

246. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
247. Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000).
248. L.F.P.IP, Inc. v. Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., No. 1:09cv0913 (WOB), 2011
WL 5024356 at *8 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2011), aff'd sub nom. L.F.P.IP, LLC v.
Hustler Cincinnati, Inc., 533 F. App'x 615 (6th Cir. 2013).
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